We build a privacy-preserving system of linear regression protecting both input data secrecy and output privacy. Our system achieves those goals simultaneously via a novel combination of homomorphic encryption and differential privacy dedicated to linear regression and its variants (ridge, LASSO). Our system is proved scalable over cloud servers, and its efficiency is extensively checked by careful experiments.
Introduction

Background
Imaginatively, the storage and computation on the cloud can be seen as storing data and performing computations on a huge and globally available "machine". Formally, a definition of cloud computing is given by NIST in [18] saying that it is a "model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction."
Among others, machine learning is benefited from the development of cloud computing. Indeed, current commercial platforms such as the Amazon Machine Learning [1] or the Google Cloud Machine Learning Platform [2] allows clients to upload data to cloud servers to do various machine learning tasks.
The benefits of cloud computing come with threats, typically one of which is that plain data stored in the cloud may be accessed unwillingly. Promisingly, homomorphic encryption can balance the situation, as it enables input data secrecy and the computations over the data even in encrypted form, on which the discussion can go back far to Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos [23] in 1978. Specifically, a client can store encrypted data on the cloud to enjoy the service, but at the same time can ensure that no useful information is leaked to the storage. On the other hand, output privacy refers to the protection of the output of a mining system against inference attacks, namely those guessing useful information on an individual data given the output. As a measure for output privacy, differential privacy [9] ensures that the presence of any single data item will not much affect the output.
Our Contributions
Results. We build a system for linear regression and its ridge and LASSO * * variants protecting both input (i.e. training) data secrecy and output privacy, simultaneously. We instantiate our system with a modern LWE-based homomorphic public key encryption scheme, which is a variant of [16] , [22] .
Our system is extremely fast in time and modest in communication. For example, on real datasets, our system finishes in milliseconds with less than 100 kilobytes of communication (see Fig. 3 for details). For large datasets, the efficiency is still reasonable (see Fig. 4 ).
To position our work into the literature, let us compare with [12] , [13] , [20] , [26] . Previous systems accomplished either input data secrecy as in [12] , [13] , [20] or output privacy as in [26] independently, but not both as showed in the following table.
Technical outlines. Theorems 2 and 3 are considered the technical results of this paper, and are achieved by a combination dedicated to linear regression of homomorphic encryption and differential privacy.
Along the way of designing our system, we need a few tricks. First, we view linear regression as an optimization problem, not as a matrix inversion problem. Second, each data source slightly pre-processes its data before encryption. 
System
Input data secrecy Output privacy [12] , [13] , [20] yes no [26] no yes Ours yes yes
Third, each pre-processed data item is packed in one ciphertext using the LWE-based encryption scheme. Fourth, we arrange the encrypted data items so that the server can handle them correctly. Finally, the client with decryption key does some light post-processing work.
More Related Works
Linear regression has been used successfully in medical research [24] with geographically distributed data sources (concretely, 21 research groups from 9 countries and 4 continents). Our system for privacy preserving linear regression can help protecting data in this kind of medical research scenarios, particularly when the number of data N data and data dimension d get large. Indeed, getting sufficient data is very important for better results in medical prediction. In the dataset of [24] , the number of data records N data = 5700, the data dimension d = 17, and yet they wrote ". Linear regression (whose outputs are continuous) is related but different from logistic regression (whose outputs are discrete). Various privacy-preserving systems for logistic regression have been built in [5] - [7] , [19] .
Preliminaries
Let Z (0,s) be the discrete Gaussian distribution over the integers Z, with mean 0 and deviation s > 0. The mark g ← is for "sampling at random from a discrete Gaussian" set, so that x g ← Z (0,s) means x appearing with probability proportional to exp(−πx 2 /s 2 ). Below, $ ← means "sampling at random uniformly". Also, Z q ⊂ (−q/2, q/2] is the set of integers of centered modulus q.
Learning with Errors (LWE)
Related to the decision LWE assumption LWE(n, s, q), where n, s, q depend on the security parameter λ, consider matrix A
Then vector Ax + e is computed over Z q . Define the following advantage of a poly-time probabilistic algorithm D:
The LWE assumption asserts that Adv LWE(n,s,q) D (λ) is negligible as a function of λ.
Additively Homomorphic Encryption
Definition 1: Public key homomorphic encryption (PHE) schemes consist of the following (possibly probabilistic) poly-time algorithms.
• ParamGen(1 λ ) → pp: λ is the security parameter and the public parameter pp is implicitly fed in following algorithms.
• KeyGen(1 λ ) → (pk, sk): pk is the public key, while sk is the secret key.
• Enc(pk, m) → c: probabilistic encryption algorithm produces c, the ciphertext of message m.
• Dec(sk, c) → m: decryption algorithm returns message m encrypted in c.
• Add(c, c ): In Add, for ciphertexts c and c , the output is the encryption of plaintext addition c add .
• DecA(sk, c add ): decrypting c add to obtain an addition of plaintexts.
Definition 2: With respect to a PHE scheme as in Definition 1, consider the following game between an adversary A and a challenger:
• Setup. The challenger creates pp and key pairs (pk, sk). Then pp and pk are given to A. • Challenge. A chooses two plaintexts m 0 , m 1 of the same length, then submits them to the challenger, who in turn takes b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and computes C * = Enc(pk, m b ). The challenge ciphertext C * is returned to A, who produces a bit b .
A PHE scheme is CPA-secure if the advantage
is negligible in λ.
Building Block: A Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
We will use the following encryption scheme, which is a variant of [22] and relying on the idea of [16] for reducing the public key size.
•
Return the public key pk = (A, P, n, s), and the secret key sk = S .
We prove security of the above scheme according to Definition 2.
Theorem 1 (CPA security): The above additively homomorphic encryption scheme is CPA-secure under the LWE assumption. Specifically, for any poly-time adversary A, there is an algorithm D of essentially the same running time such that
Proof 1:
The proof follows [16] closely. First, we modify the original game in Definition 2 by providing A with a random P $ ← Z n×l q . Namely P = pR − AS ∈ Z n×l q is turned to a random matrix. This is indistinguishable to A thanks to the LWE assumption with secret vectors as l columns of S . More precisely, we need the condition gcd(p, q) = 1 to reduce P = pR − AS ∈ Z n×l q to the LWE form. Indeed, p
is also random. Therefore,
is random under the LWE assumption which in turn means P is random as claimed.
Second, the challenge ciphertext c
] is turned to random. This relies on the LWE assumption with secret vector e 1 , while also basing on the first modification so that [A|P] is a random matrix. Here, the condition gcd(p, q) = 1 is also necessary as above. Thus b is perfectly hidden after this change. The factor l+1 is due to l uses of LWE in changing P and 1 use in changing c * .
The following properties of the variant are worth mentioning:
• Arbitrarily poly-packing of data. Due to Theorem 1, there are rooms for choosing parameters (l, p) in the message space Z l p to fit each specific application, as they are not tightly related to parameters deciding security (n, s, q).
For example, as l (message length) and n (LWE dimension) can be different, we can set (l, n) = (16128, 3530) as in our system in Sect. 4.
• Encode real numbers. Real numbers of precision prec = (L + +1) (e.g. = 64) bits are encoded via signed bit vectors, namely a, b ∈ R are expressed as
in which all a k ∈ {0, 1} if a ≥ 0 and a k ∈ {0, −1} if a < 0, and likewise for b k . For a ∈ R, define vectors
1×prec .
• Encrypt real numbers. For a real number a precision prec, naturally define its encryption as
where Enc is the encryption algorithm above. The decryption of E a using the DecA algorithm yields Bits(a) ∈ Z 1×prec p . If p ≥ 2, there will be no wrap-around (overflow) and Bits(a) ∈ Z 1×prec is obtained, yielding the real number
where ·, · is the inner product. When multiple additions are done over ciphertexts, the plaintexts are also added due to the homomorphic property. Even if each plaintext coordinate is in {−1, 0, 1}, the sum of all N data plaintexts can make each summed coordinate grow into the range [−N data , N data ]. To prevent wrappingaround modulo p, we need [−N data , N data ] ⊂ Z p so that we need p/2 > N data . As we would like to deal with big N data of order 10 8 , we choose p = 2 30 + 1. See also Sect. 4.6.
Privacy Preserving Linear, Ridge, and LASSO Regressions
This section contains our main results.
Following [11] , [23] , consider the scenario of outsourced computation using homomorphic encryption: a client outsources its data to a cloud server for computation and storage, but does not want to leak any information to the cloud server. In the following we recap the details.
Model outline. The general picture of the protocol is in Fig. 1 . We use E pk (data (i) ) (1 ≤ i ≤ N data ) to represent the encryption of the data under a public key pk. Anyone can contribute data; e.g., the data can be
• from the client itself, or • possibly from various geographically distributed data contributors.
After receiving the encrypted data, using homomorphic property of E pk , the computing server does necessary computations and sends the output E pk (Θ) to the data analyst, from which Θ is recovered by decryption, and the final result θ * is obtained (from Θ). Note that, naively Θ = θ * but it is not a must. For example, in [15] , [19] 
and θ * = θ * 1 /θ * 2 ∈ R, as current homomorphic encryption schemes do not support division directly. Indeed, required is that θ * can be efficiently derived from Θ. We will exploit this property in depth in designing our system. Key generation. The client generates the public and secret key pair (pk, sk) and publicly distributes pk. Data encryption. Data from the client or many contributors is encrypted and sent to the outsourced server. We assume that these encryption and uploading processes are always correctly executed.
Threat and protection goal. The outsourced server is assumed honest-but-curious: it is curious on any information from the data, and yet is honest in instructed computations. This curious nature of the server is considered a threat. The protection goal of our protocol in Fig. 1 is to hide any information of the data from the server.
This honest-but-curious assumption is reasonable to model an economically motivated cloud service provider: it wants to provide excellent service for a successful business, but would be interested in any extra available information. On the other hand, a malicious cloud service provider can mishandle calculations, delete data, refuse to return results, collude with other parties etc. Nevertheless, it is likely to be caught in most of these malicious behaviors, and hence harms its reputation in business. Therefore, we will stick to the assumption of honest-but-curious server.
Extended Model: Input Data Secrecy + Differential Privacy
Figure 2 extends Fig. 1 by additionally considering differential privacy, namely output privacy in the sense that the output θ * reveals nothing meaningful from any specific input data (i) . For that purpose, we view the server and the client and their interactions as an interactive mechanism I = (Server, Client) with inputs data (1) , . . . , data (N data ) and output θ * . In Fig. 2, • The mechanism I encrypts its input data and feeds the resulting ciphertexts to the outsourced server.
• The server and the client behave as in Sect. 4.1.
Let D and D * be two neighbor databases, namely 
for any output θ * .
The above definition naturally extends the definition in the literature [9] in which I is a randomized algorithm. Intuitively, the definition ensures that the change in any single data item will not much affect the final output.
Tweaking the Cost Functions of Linear Regression
Cost function of linear regression. Data dimension, namely the number of features, is denoted by d. The number of data items, namely the training set size, is denoted by N data . Each training data item is denoted as (
Linear hypothesis is a linear function h
The cost function over training data is usually defined as
Tweaking the cost function for our system.
the cost function in (3) can be expressed as a convex quadratic function J cost : R d+1 → R,
and the task of linear regression is to produce
using any method of numerical optimization [21] (e.g., gradient descent, conjugate gradient, BFGS, L-BFGS). As J cost at (7) has d + 1 variables, the cost to produce the minimizer θ * depends on d.
Extensions to ridge and LASSO regression. The above backgrounds and tweak can be straightforwardly applied to ridge regression and LASSO, where the cost functions are defined respectively as J cost (θ) + μ||θ|| 2 2 (ridge) and J cost (θ) + μ||θ|| 1 (LASSO) for some parameter μ ∈ R. When μ = 0, those regressions become exactly linear regression. When μ > 0, a solution θ with small norm is preferable. As the added term μ||θ|| 2 2 or μ||θ|| 1 does not vary with data items, the following subsections remain almost unchanged even with those variants. The only change is in the client side, and we will note that in place later.
Basic System: Achieving Input Data Secrecy
For clarity, we first present our basic system of securely outsourced linear regression under the model outlined in Fig. 1 . The full system under the model of Fig. 2 will be described in the next subsection.
The work flow in our system is described in four steps (0)-(3) as follows.
Via normalization, without loss of generality, we assume that −1 ≤ x
(1) Encryption at each data source (or client). The encryption E pk (data (i) ) from any data source (or the client) is done as follows:
• Consider prec bit representations of all x
and above u
· prec, and do the encryption
where Enc is the encryption algorithm in Sect. 3. The ciphertext result is a vector in Z
, and is sent to the server.
(2) Outsourced server. Having all ciphertexts E (i) , the cloud server computes the sum
and sends the result to the client. The computational cost of (8) 
and
Bits(u
from which the client, via multiplying with Pow(2, L, ) at (1), obtains the following real numbers (4), (5), and (6). Having these O(d 2 ) coefficients of J cost (θ) at (7), the client then finds θ * = argmin θ J cost (θ) via optimization methods in numerical computing [21] such as the BFGS method whose costs depend on d.
For ridge (likewise, LASSO) regression,
2 ) at the client side. Other methods (e.g., gradient descent, conjugate gradient, L-BFGS) can also be used at the client to minimize J cost (θ).
Theorem 2 (Input data secrecy): The above system leaks nothing on the data to the outsourced server, assuming that the encryption scheme is CPA-secure.
Proof 2:
The server receives and computes over encrypted data. The encryption scheme satisfies CPA security (via Theorem 1), so that no information on the plain data can be computationally leaked to the server.
Communication cost between server and client. The cost of sending the computed result is only the size of E at (8), which is in bits
Moreover, in the store phase, as E (i) has the same size of E at (8), the cost of each store is also (9).
Full System: Achieving Input Data Secrecy and Differential Privacy
Differential privacy intuitively ensures that the output leaks almost no information on each single data item.
Difficulty: the Laplace mechanism is not applicable. To add differential privacy, the usual approach is to use Laplace mechanism [9] , namely adding Laplace noise to the output θ * . That approach will not work for linear regression since it is hard to determine parameters for the Laplace noises; or equivalently it is hard to compute the sensitivity of the algorithm finding the minimizer θ * of J cost (θ). This difficulty applies also to [13] , [20] for the same reason.
Our approach. We make use of the functional mechanism [26] . Namely, we add noises of Laplace distribution into the coefficients A k, j , B j , and C of the cost function at (7), while keeping those coefficients encrypted.
Below gives more details. Recall that, a noise x ∈ R has Lap(σ) distribution if its probability density function is 1 2σ exp(−|x|/σ). To obtain -differential privacy, the only change we need is the computation of the client. Namely, the client itself generates Laplace noises from the Lap(n d / ) distribution, where
as showed below), and does the following computation
Theorem 3 (Differential privacy): With the change in (10), the system in Sect. 4.4 satisfies -differential privacy (Definition 3).
Proof 3:
It is necessary to show that, for any output θ * ,
The final computation θ * = argmin θ J cost (θ) at the client is deterministic, and the function J cost (θ) is determined by its its coefficients (A k, j , B j , C) at (4), (5), (6) . Therefore, θ * is determined by the coefficients (A k, j , B j , C) so that the above is equivalent to proving
When a training set D is used, we make D explicit in those coefficients as
and likewise for those related to the training set D * . Moreover,
are the coefficients perturbed by the mechanism I. Similarly, A k, j,D * , B j,D * , C D * are defined with respect to D * . Then (11) becomes
whose left hand side is δ 1 · δ 2 · δ 3 where
which simplifies to
Since datasets D and D * differ at only the final N data -th item,
in which, via the normalization of the data, we assume that x
are real numbers in the range [−1, 1]. Therefore, so that
This ends the proof.
Discussion: Privacy vs. Accuracy. Adding Laplace noises as in (10) gives us differential privacy (Theorem 3), but will decrease the accuracy of the system. Fix the privacy budget , say 0.1 ≤ ≤ 10, the added noises have distribution Lap(n d / ) = Lap((d 2 + 3d + 4)/ ), meaning its deviation quadratically depends on data dimension d. Generally, if d is small, the added noises are small, so good accuracy will be obtained; reversely, large d gives bad accuracy. The accuracy is only depends on data dimension d, but not the number of data records N data , so that we can even set large N data = 10 8 as in the next section. It is worth mentioning that the trade-off between privacy and accuracy is well-known, as already examined in [10] , [26] .
Our System Costs and Comparisons
Parameter selections. To handle big N data , we choose q = 2 114 , p = 2 30 + 1, s = 8.0, and n = 3530 (for 128-bit security). As p = 2 30 + 1, the number of data records N data can be as large as p/2 (≈ 10 8.72 ). In other words, no overflow in additions (of real numbers) will occur as long as the number of ciphertexts received by the cloud server is less than p/2 . For smaller N data , the parameters can be smaller. The bit security is estimated via existing attacks on LWE in [4] , [8] , [16] , [17] . The plaintext length Since often l n in the ciphertext space Z n+l q , our system's costs for communication and computation will mainly depend on l (and hence data dimension d) when global modulus q and precision prec are fixed.
Gaussian sampling. To generate discrete Gaussian noises, Fig. 3 The costs of our system using the UCI datasets [3] . we employ the Knuth-Yao algorithm [14] . For reference, when s = 8.0, we can generate more than 4.1 · 10 4 Gaussian samples in one millisecond in one thread with 256-bit precision, using only 1.65 megabytes to store a binary tree. Figs. 3  and 4 . Specifically, on real UCI datasets [3] with N data < 10 4 and d ≤ 20, our system finishes in milliseconds with less than 100 kilobytes of communication.
Experimental results. Experimental results are in
On simulated datasets with very large number of data records N data = 10 8 , we show that our system on a commodity server can finish in acceptable times depending on data dimension 10 ≤ d ≤ 80.
Comparisons with previous works [13] , [20] . The differences are in Table 2 . Below give the details.
• (Views on regression) We view (linear, ridge) regression as the problem of a quadratic function optimization, while in [13] , [20] as matrix inversion.
• (Crypto model choices) We use the model of [11] , [23] , while [20] combines homomorphic encryption with Yao's garbled circuits [25] . The use of garbled circuits (for matrix inversion) causes several rounds of interactions and megabytes of communication in [20] .
• (Server computation in [20] ) In turn, the server in [20] • (Our server computation) In contrast, in our system, the server does O(N data ) ciphertext additions; the client decrypts once to obtain all coefficients of J cost (θ) at (7), and then minimize that convex quadratic function of d+1 variables, so that our approach scales better with d in both computation and communication. For example, even with dimension d = 40, the communication cost between the server and the client is only about 861 Kbytes computed via (9) using parameters for 80-bit security. Furthermore, if using the BFGS method to find the minimizer of J cost (θ), the computational cost is O(d 2 ) arithmetic operations with superlinear convergence rate [21] . Concretely, using the fminunc function (which implements the BFGS algorithm) in Octave 3.8.1 on a laptop, the minimizer θ * is found in less than 1 minute when d ≤ 99.
• (Preconditions on the systems) It is worth noting that, in [20] , if the outsourced server and the garbled circuit provider (called crypto service provider or CSP in [20] ) are colluded, then both can decrypt and learn all the data, so that no-collusion is assumed to ensure the security of their system. In ours, we follow [11] , [23] assuming that the client is honest and can decrypt the encrypted data, and pay all security attention to the semi-honest outsourced server. These different preconditions on the systems, besides computation and communication costs, should be fully realized before any deployment in practice.
Conclusion
We build a privacy-preserving system for linear (ridge, LASSO) regressions which is efficiently scalable, while protecting both input (in terms of secrecy) and output (in terms of differential privacy). This is the first system of its kind for privacy-preserving linear regression.
